We Arabs: Who Are We, and Where Are We Going?
Part Twenty-Seven
(This is a translation from the original Arabic, offered so that my grandchildren, and others of their generation, may understand something of their history— a history they were denied when they were uprooted without choice.)
Where To: What Have We to Do with the United Nations? — (3)
A friend wrote to me in response to the previous instalment of this series, asking what tangible benefits the Arabs might have gained had they withdrawn from the United Nations at any of the moments I enumerated in my earlier article—taking into account, of course, the condition of the Arab world at those times.
I do not dispute my friend’s observation that the victor does not grant the defeated an opportunity. What I do take issue with is the defeated party’s voluntary acceptance of self-imposed constraints it has no need to bear. Nor do I deny the fractured state of the Arab condition—whether born of ignorance or of deliberate calculation—at each of those historical junctures. Had I believed the nation to be united and prosperous, I would not have taken upon myself the burden of writing at all. I write precisely because I possess a vision of what the nation ought to strive for: a vision that seeks to expose the points of failure in past experience, so that future generations may yet glimpse the possibility of success.
This series was conceived upon principled and constant foundations—principles that do not change with time, nor depend upon the nature of the political system or the name of the ruler. Its aim is to persuade the coming generation that their future and their true interests transcend the narrow outlook of their forebears, an outlook shaped by fear: fear of the “Arab invader” beyond artificially drawn borders, fear that feeds a scramble over an illusory wealth grounded in energy resources whose global importance is itself transient. Within a century, oil will have lost its value, as sun and wind become the world’s primary sources of energy.
To raise generations upon this understanding is to lead them inevitably to the conviction that the unity of the nation—by whatever means necessary, including force—is the foundational condition for its future. When the Arab comes to understand that his future lies in unity, he will realize that there is no need to seek foreign protection, and all exploitative foreign presence upon Arab land will vanish as a natural right—no different from the right of any people upon this earth. On that day, the nation may begin a life of freedom and dignity, choosing for itself—freely—the values, politics, economy, and relationships under which it wishes to live.
I have sought to demonstrate that the true balance lies between what occurred and what might have occurred had the Arabs withdrawn from the United Nations. My friend’s question obliges me to imagine how matters might have unfolded had such a withdrawal taken place at any of the moments I identified. I cannot offer a definitive answer, for such an answer would necessarily be hypothetical. Yet I respond as I have before: could the outcome truly have been worse than what actually transpired, had the Arabs withdrawn from an international project that was—and remains—managed by the great European powers?
Let us pause at one single moment: October 1973, when the Arabs, for the first time in their modern history, initiated military action rather than merely responding to aggression. Had the Arabs withdrawn from the United Nations at that juncture and halted the flow of oil for a single year, European populations would have risen against their governments, and the United Nations itself would have come to the Arabs seeking their return—on Arab terms. Let no one claim that Europeans live by immutable principles or that they would have acted otherwise; history has already exposed the falseness of such assertions.
Today we live in circumstances analogous to those of 1973, though the opposing parties differ. Had the Arabs halted the supply of oil and gas to Europe when Europe cut itself off from Russian energy, Europe would have been compelled to submit to Arab rights, for it possesses no viable alternative.
We need only look to the experience of two states over the past decades to understand the condition of those effectively outside the United Nations—whether or not they remain members in name alone. The distinction, in truth, is secondary. I refer to Cuba and North Korea.
When Cuba’s remarkable revolution triumphed over the capitalist corruption that had turned the island into a playground of gambling and prostitution, exploiting its people as tools—much like the fate of most nations in Central and South America, lands misnamed “America” by their European conquerors—global capitalism could not tolerate such a blow. It sought to strangle Cuba through a devastating blockade, scarcely different from the siege imposed upon Iraq thirty years later. Military intervention was attempted, but nuclear deterrence with the Soviet Union thwarted its success. Global Zionism then compelled its many allies and agents to sever relations with Cuba, and succeeded in excluding it from the most significant institutions operating under the umbrella of the United Nations. Thus, Cuba became, in effect, outside the UN in everything but name.
Yet this small nation—limited in territory and population, devoid of energy resources, and economically weak—endured. It stood firm, achieving a level of independence and development envied by many of its subjugated and humiliated neighbours across Central and South America.
Cuba achieved all this while effectively outside the United Nations.
As for North Korea, whose people had constituted the true productive force under Japanese colonial rule, they naturally aspired to an independent state. The details of Korea’s post–World War II history are extensive, but what concerns us here is that the United States, through its control of the United Nations, succeeded in severing the southern half of the country, intervened militarily to prevent reunification, isolated North Korea from the world, and barred it from UN membership until 1991. A crushing blockade followed, enforced by allied states.
North Korea persisted outside the United Nations. The path was not easy, yet today it is a country no one dares to assault or violate. It has risen and built itself independently of the UN framework. Had it been a compliant member, it would have been bound by treaties invented by global capitalism—treaties that would have prevented it from developing the self-reliant power that today shields it from foreign aggression.
I do not call for isolation from the world; I call for justice. If the United Nations is incapable of preventing aggression against the Arabs, why should we consent to it? If it were to become a just organization—one that upholds rights and restrains oppression and aggression—I would not oppose Arab cooperation with it. My call for withdrawal is a means of compelling the UN to act according to principles of justice. If it does so, all the better; if not, what value does membership truly hold?
Responding to my friend’s question compels me to move to a clearer example of the harm inflicted upon the Arabs through adherence to what has emerged from the United Nations. I will not attempt to survey every organization the Arabs joined unnecessarily, only to suffer damage as a result. Instead, I will confine myself to Arab commitments to treaties and institutions related to weaponry—given the central importance of arms as the ultimate instrument of power in the world.
Here a crucial truth must be clarified: the right of any state to arm itself is among the oldest principles of customary international law. The right to self-defense is beyond dispute, and it is unacceptable for one state to restrict another’s right to acquire arms. Faced with this reality—which threatened to limit their dominance—the great powers exploited the Security Council and the UN Charter to violate the foundational rules of international law. They selectively labelled the weapons of certain states as threats to international peace and security, thereby justifying intervention.
In doing so, they breached multiple legal principles. They elevated the Security Council above international law itself—an impossibility, since the states that ratified the UN Charter never authorized the organization to violate international law. They annulled the fundamental principle affirming each state’s right to choose its own armaments. Worse still, they established a new rule: that the great powers alone may arm themselves as they wish, while retaining the right to deny others the weapons they deem necessary for their defense.
This policy was then institutionalized through treaties, conventions, and organizations designed to enforce it. Thus, the great powers succeeded in subjugating the world to their control over weaponry—reserving for themselves absolute freedom of armament while denying it to others. In this manner, Zionism—though not acting alone, for reasons beyond the scope of this discussion—managed to harness the Security Council and the UN Charter to dominate our region in particular, and the world at large.
What, then, are these treaties? What are the organizations established to administer this Zionist control over our world? And how did Arab governments—willingly or unwillingly—fall into line, entering a system of servitude and paying exorbitant prices to do so?
These questions will be addressed in the next instalment.
To be continued…