When I wrote my article of counsel to my Omani brethren, entitled Oman and the Politics of Timidity, it was only to be expected that it would evoke both approval and disapproval. Whoever seeks universal agreement has no business writing. Among the responses I received, only hours after its publication, was a message from an Iraqi scholar and dear friend, a man who holds Oman and its people in high esteem and who maintains close and enduring ties with the Sultanate. His message included comments made by an Omani official regarding my article.
Although my Omani friend disagreed with what I had written, he responded with the exemplary courtesy that I have long associated with the people of Oman, displaying grace even in disagreement. His remarks prompted me to write again—not merely for Oman, but for the Arab nation as a whole, whose varying degrees of subjection to Zionist hegemony extend far beyond Oman, which may not even represent its gravest manifestation.
The objection raised by my Omani friend is one I have encountered many times before. It has become a familiar refrain among those who seek to justify the Zionist military presence on Arab soil. Their argument rests upon the claim that there are no foreign military bases, but merely military and security cooperation agreements. My friend expressed it as follows:
“I do not believe there are any foreign military bases in Oman. There may well be military and security cooperation agreements with the United States, Britain, and the West generally, but these amount only to cooperation and logistical facilities governed by agreed conditions and subject to Omani approval.”
Such attempts to soften the reality of Zionist domination over the Arab world by arguing that these are not “bases” but merely agreements are, in my view, intellectually unconvincing. The Arabic word qa’idah is simply a translation of the English term base, the very word employed by the Zionist powers themselves. The distinction is merely semantic. One might instead describe the arrangement as a “foreign military presence” or “military access” on Arab territory, but this changes nothing of substance. The essential question is not who formally owns the land upon which these forces are stationed, but rather who enjoys its strategic benefits.
Indeed, it may even serve the Zionist power better not to own the land on which such facilities are built. Consider Al Udeid Air Base: if the land belongs to another state, the foreign power is spared the enormous costs of construction, maintenance, and operation while reaping the full strategic advantages. By contrast, it must bear the financial burden of maintaining its own air bases in places such as Germany or Cyprus.
The Defining Features of Arab–Zionist Military Agreements
Today, scarcely an Arab state exists that has not entered into some form of military, security, or strategic agreement—or at least an understanding—with one or more Zionist powers. Not all such arrangements are publicly acknowledged, nor are all officially disclosed. Yet the catalogue of known agreements that I shall present in the concluding part of this essay, together with the military privileges, facilities, and legal immunities they confer upon Zionist powers across Arab lands, should compel every Arab to pause before a mirror and ask how much self-respect remains. Only then may he wonder why the non-Arab world accords him so little respect.
There is no people on earth today, nor any geographical region, that submits to external domination to the extent that the Arab world submits to Zionist influence.
Those who rise before dawn to perform the morning prayer should seek Allah’s forgiveness and implore Him to accept their worship. Yet I fear such prayers cannot be accepted while they knowingly violate the Divine injunction:
“O you who believe, do not take the Jews and the Christians as allies. They are allies of one another. Whoever among you takes them as allies is indeed one of them. Surely Allah does not guide the wrongdoing people.”
Before examining these agreements in greater detail, several observations must be made, for they illuminate the dangers and humiliations concealed behind them.
First: The Alleged Convergence Between Arab and Zionist National Security
We did not choose our enemies; they chose us. Nor did this hostility begin in the twentieth century. It dates back to the eleventh century, when they landed upon our shores claiming they had come to protect the House of their Lord. In their hypocrisy they forgot that, had their Lord truly favoured them as they claimed, He would have manifested Himself among them rather than among us.
For centuries they remained preoccupied with wars among themselves until, in the nineteenth century, their old animosities revived. They returned in force to occupy our lands under the banner of spreading democracy—a democracy they themselves often failed to practise at home—or enforcing principles of human rights that they revise whenever convenient. Today, in Britain itself, carrying a small placard in the streets of London may suffice to invite prosecution under terrorism legislation and a prison sentence extending to fourteen years.
Within little more than a century they committed against the Arabs atrocities that complement the earlier campaigns of extermination carried out against the indigenous peoples of the Americas and Australia.
The fundamental question confronting every student of history, politics, or law is this: what is the purpose of treaties and agreements between states? The answer is self-evident: they are concluded where interests converge.
The Arab, therefore, must ask: in what conceivable respect do Arab national security and Zionist strategic interests coincide?
Is it in the seizure of Islam’s sacred sanctuary in Jerusalem?
Is it in the appropriation of Arab oil and gas?
Is it in the destruction of states that never attacked the West?
Is it in the prolonged siege imposed upon entire populations?
Is it in the systematic reshaping of educational curricula to erode the place of the Qur’an?
Or is it in the promotion of social doctrines that undermine the fabric of Arab society?
The list is endless. Where, then, does this supposed harmony of interests exist?
The contradiction between Arab national security and the global interests of Zionist powers is so profound that it leaves no rational foundation upon which a genuine partnership of common interest might be built. Agreements between nations presuppose at least some measure of shared purpose. Here, however, the opposite is true. The strategic interests of Zionism stand in direct opposition to the very existence of Arab national identity and political independence.
How, then, could any Arab state have entered into treaties or agreements with Zionist powers under such circumstances? By what reasoning could such arrangements be justified, other than the preservation of the ruler’s own authority?
Second: The Secrecy Surrounding These Treaties
No Arab government has published the full text of any treaty or agreement it has concluded with a Zionist power. Should it be argued that such secrecy is required in the interests of national security, the argument is readily dismissed. Any treaty signed with a major Western power inevitably becomes known throughout the extensive intelligence networks of allied states, whose security arrangements require the routine exchange of such information.
If an Arab ruler has so little confidence in the patriotism, loyalty, or judgment of his own people that he refuses to disclose the commitments he undertakes in their name, should he not, at the very least, submit those agreements to the elected representatives of the nation—whether Parliament, the People’s Assembly, or the Consultative Council—if only in a confidential session?
Did the Iraqi Prime Minister, for example, lay before Parliament the agreement concluded with George W. Bush following the invasion and occupation of Iraq? He did not. If this is so—and indeed it is—then what meaning remains in the repeated invocation of democracy, the very democracy that the occupation claimed to have brought to Iraq and which its supporters continue to celebrate as liberation from Ba’athist rule?
The only rational explanation for withholding these agreements from public scrutiny is that they contain provisions granting Zionist powers broad privileges, exceptional immunities, or sweeping discretionary authority—provisions that those in power dare not reveal to their own people. Were this not the case, no convincing justification could exist for maintaining such secrecy.
Third: The Absence of Any Binding Guarantee to Defend the Arab State
The North Atlantic Treaty provides, in its celebrated Article Five, that an attack upon one member shall be regarded as an attack upon all, thereby obliging every member to come to the defence of the injured state.
No comparable commitment exists in the military or security agreements concluded between Arab states and Zionist powers such as the United States, Britain, or France. None contains an enforceable obligation requiring those powers to defend the Arab state should it become the victim of external aggression.
If no such guarantee exists, by what logic can Arab rulers claim that these agreements serve the security of their people? Does not the absence of reciprocal obligations demonstrate that the sole beneficiary is invariably the Zionist power itself?
Fourth: The Illusion of Prior Arab Approval
My Omani friend, echoing an argument frequently advanced by others, observed that such agreements require the prior consent of the Arab state before any action may be undertaken by the foreign power.
Yet such a provision is of little practical value.
What, in reality, could the Arab government do if the foreign power simply proceeded without requesting approval? What effective remedy would exist if operations were conducted despite an explicit refusal of consent?
More importantly, since the agreements themselves remain secret, how can anyone know whether they contain exceptions permitting unilateral action whenever the foreign power deems the circumstances to involve “national necessity,” “urgent security,” or “extraordinary danger”? A clause of this nature would effectively nullify any requirement for prior approval whenever the foreign power chose to invoke it.
Thus, even where the principle of consent appears to exist, it may amount to little more than a legal fiction.
Fifth: The Argument of Military Training and the Exchange of Expertise
Arab governments that have entered into what the author regards as degrading agreements with Zionist powers frequently argue that their purpose is to improve the effectiveness of Arab armed forces and intelligence services through training, technical cooperation, and the exchange of professional expertise. This argument is rejected on several grounds.
First, the military and intelligence establishments of the Zionist powers have little to learn from their Arab counterparts. Nor, do they possess any genuine interest in strengthening Arab militaries. No state willingly develops the military capabilities of another unless it is certain that such strength can never one day be turned against itself—particularly when it knows that no Arab ruler can ever be entirely secure in the permanence of his own authority.
Secondly, the very nature of warfare has been transformed by the digital revolution. Modern conflict is increasingly shaped by information technology, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, and inexpensive unmanned aerial vehicles. Those unable to master these technologies will possess neither decisive military capability nor meaningful strategic value in future wars.
Since Zionist military doctrine continues to rely heavily upon nuclear superiority, less emphasis has been placed upon adapting to certain forms of modern asymmetric warfare. Recent conflicts, have demonstrated that large numbers of inexpensive drones can disable sophisticated air bases equipped with advanced aircraft such as the F-35, each valued at many tens of millions of dollars and capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Developments in the war in Ukraine, together with the recent Zionist campaign against Iran, are cited as evidence that military power is entering a new technological era.
Because nuclear capabilities remain beyond the reach of Arab states, any genuine programme of military cooperation should focus instead upon mastering the technologies that define contemporary warfare. Having followed the British Army closely over the past decade, I observed that successive Chiefs of the General Staff have openly acknowledged serious deficiencies in the Army’s ability to adapt to modern methods of warfare. Indeed, Britain’s own Defence Minister, shortly after leaving office, reportedly described comprehensive reform of the armed forces as virtually impossible. What useful military knowledge could the Omani Army realistically acquire from its British counterpart that would justify such extensive agreements? Military cooperation with China or even North Korea would likely prove more beneficial for a developing army such as Oman’s.
The foregoing observations are not intended as an exhaustive treatment of the subject. Rather, they are offered as a framework through which the reader may assess the true nature of the military and security arrangements concluded between Arab governments and Zionist powers. The question is not merely whether foreign forces are described as “bases,” “facilities,” or “cooperation missions.” Such terminology obscures rather than illuminates the reality.
The essential issue is whether these agreements diminish Arab sovereignty, confer exceptional rights and privileges upon foreign powers, and bind Arab states to strategic interests that are fundamentally incompatible with their own national aspirations. If they do, then the language employed to describe them becomes a matter of semantics rather than substance.
In the next instalment, I shall present a comprehensive table of the treaties, agreements, and military arrangements known to exist between Arab states and Zionist powers. I shall also examine the military privileges, and strategic advantages that arise from them, demonstrating the extent of the political and military influence thereby established across the Arab world.
Only by examining these agreements in detail can one appreciate the scale of the strategic dependency they have created and judge for oneself whether such arrangements serve the interests of the Arab peoples or those of the external powers with whom they have been concluded.
To be continued.
Abdul-Haq Al-Ani
24 June 2026