Part Fifteen
(This is a translation from the original Arabic, offered so that my grandchildren,
and others of their generation, may understand something of their history— a
history they were denied when they were uprooted without choice.)
What Did the Arab Nationalists Do? (3)
I concluded the previous installment by posing the question of the most serious
errors committed by the leaders of the Arab nationalist project in their conduct
and political choices. This is what I attempt to address in today’s essay.
What follows is an outline of the most consequential positions and policies in
which Arab nationalists erred—errors that damaged the nationalist project and
contributed to its obstruction, if not its failure. I will not dwell at length on each
case, as doing so would take me beyond the purpose of these articles, which aim
at review and synthesis. My primary concern is what must be done in the future,
rather than what should have been done in the past. I must also emphasize that
identifying these errors does not negate the genuine achievements realized
under the leadership of figures within the Arab nationalist movement.
- Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Defense of Kuwait’s “Independence” in 1961
Gamal Abdel Nasser’s defense of Kuwait’s right to form a fictitious state
following Britain’s nominal withdrawal in 1961 was incompatible with any
nationalist principle. Regardless of his disagreements with ʿAbd al-Karim
Qasim, Nasser should have supported Iraq’s legitimate Arab claim to the return
of Kuwait—excised from its geography by the colonial power. The unity of the
nation must precede all other considerations. When any justification obstructs
the goal of unity, faith in unity itself becomes suspect. - The Ambiguous Position of the Iraqi and Syrian Baʿath in 1961 on
Kuwait
Equally damaging was the Baʿathists’ ambiguous stance—whether through
opposition to Kuwait’s reintegration into Iraq or through claims of “no position”
at all. Any Baʿathist discourse on Arab unity becomes meaningless if the party
cannot affirm unity within Iraq itself. How could the nation have been unified
under their leadership if they would not demand the return of Kuwait—whose
detachment from Iraq by British Zionist hands has never been historically
disproven? - Support for Syria’s Secession from Egypt in 1961
The support offered by Syrian Baʿathists and other Arab nationalists for Syria’s
secession from Egypt exposed the fragility of their convictions. The fabrication
of flimsy justifications revealed the shallowness of their commitment. Unity
must be defended despite its flaws. The unity of Egypt and Syria was—and
remains—the gravest threat to Zionist interests, as even the British ambassador
in Egypt acknowledged when Muhammad ʿAli Pasha sent his son to Syria.
Germany would not exist today without Bismarck’s forcible unification. Italy
would not exist without Garibaldi’s military consolidation of its feuding
duchies. The United States itself was born from a bloody war of unification that
claimed over a million lives.
- Sabotaging the Egypt–Syria–Iraq Unity Project of 1963
The failure of the 1963 unity proposal between Egypt and the Baʿath regimes of
Iraq and Syria stands as stark testimony to the superficiality of nationalist
conviction across all parties. Nasser failed to grasp that the Arab street in Iraq
and Syria differed fundamentally from that of Egypt. At the same time, attempts
by Baʿathists to diminish Nasser’s leadership role doomed the project.
Had this most ambitious Arab project of the twentieth century succeeded, much
of the subsequent catastrophe would never have occurred. The absence of
capable leadership within the Iraqi and Syrian Baʿath made disagreement
inexcusable; what prevailed instead were delusions of grandeur inflated in small
minds. - The Irrational Hostility Between the Iraqi and Syrian Baʿath
I do not doubt the sincerity of Baʿath leaderships in both Iraq and Syria in their
adoption of the Arab nationalist project. Yet the rupture between two
leaderships born of the same movement—once members of a single party
command—cannot be explained without assuming Zionist penetration at some
level. How else can one understand their competition to appease Gulf
Cooperation Council states that were openly hostile to Arab nationalism, even
as each claimed leadership of the same cause? - Harbouring Kurdish Separatist Leaders
At various times, both Egypt and Syria harboured Kurdish separatist leaders
from Iraq. I do not fault Nasser or Hafez al-Assad for supporting the Kurdish
people’s right to self-determination. What I fault them for is hosting leaders
who were allies and agents of Zionism. Is it acceptable that political disputes
with Qasim or Saddam Hussein should justify supporting Zionist allies in
northern Iraq? Syrians, more than anyone else today, understand the cost of that
error. - The Iraq–Iran War
The Iraq–Iran war remains, and will long remain, a subject clouded by emotion
and sectarianism, obscuring any objective historical understanding. Yet one
incontrovertible truth remains: the eight-year war of destruction permanently
removed Iraq from the central struggle confronting the nationalist
project—namely, resistance to global Zionism. Anyone unable to grasp this has
no connection to Arab nationalism. With Iraq removed from the field, and Egypt
already neutralized, the Arab political system surrendered to Zionism—as
indeed occurred. - The Historic Error of Iraq’s Recovery of Kuwait in 1990
I may be among the few who believe that Arab unity must ultimately be
achieved by force—not in the interest of any ruler, but because it is the only
path to the nation’s survival and dignity. I could justify this at length, but this is
not the place.
I do not object to reminding the rulers of Kuwait or the other fictitious Gulf
entities of the existence of the Arab nation. I object to the attempt to reclaim
Kuwait in 1990 at the worst possible moment in international
balance—immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The damage
might have been contained had Iraq withdrawn quickly upon realizing the
fragility of its position against the Zionist-assembled coalition. Instead,
Baʿathist Iraq provided Zionism with the pretext it needed to strike the Arab
nation with a blow unmatched since World War I—a project whose final stages
are still unfolding in Syria today. - Syrian Baʿath Support for the 1991 Zionist Assault on Iraq
Perhaps the darkest stain on the Arab nationalist project was Syria’s
participation in the new Zionist order against the Arab nation—beginning with
the 1991 invasion of Iraq and continuing today in Syria itself. I need not
elaborate. I am certain that every Syrian officer who served in the so-called
symbolic Syrian force—allegedly sent to defend Kuwait’s
“independence”—feels shame at having stood under the command of the
Zionist general Schwarzkopf. - Libya’s Support for the Iraqi “Opposition”
Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi financed several movements opposed to
Baʿathist rule in Iraq. I am unaware of any justification he ever offered for this
conduct. While one might understand the personal animosity between Hafez al-
Assad and Saddam Hussein, no such hostility existed between Saddam and
Gaddafi. The fall of Baʿathist Iraq offered Libya—and Gaddafi—no
conceivable benefit. - Syria’s Sponsorship of Shiʿi Islamist Movements Against Iraq
One of the most bewildering contradictions in the late twentieth-century Arab
nationalist project is Syria’s sponsorship of sectarian Islamist movements
seeking the overthrow of a Baʿathist state—however flawed—in favour of a
sectarian religious movement allied with Zionism. Syrian intelligence services
were well aware that leaders of the Daʿwa Party, like the Kurdish leaders they
supported, maintained continuous contact with Israeli, British, and American
intelligence agencies through direct engagement in European capitals.
After this concise review of the failures of Arab nationalism in
practice—though not in its aims—we must move to the essential question:
Where do we go from here?
That is what I shall attempt to explore next.
To be continued…