I had previously resolved not to write about the outcome of the Zionist aggression against Iran while it was still ongoing. Yet I write today, now that the aggression has subsided under the pretext of illusory negotiations. This pause allows me to reflect on what has thus far emerged from the conflict, without venturing into speculation about its ultimate course.
Before proceeding, however, I must reiterate the purpose behind this series of articles. When I began writing them in 2019, my aim was to demonstrate that Iraq’s future is contingent upon the outcome of the struggle between Iran and Zionism. Iraq itself, in this equation, has no meaningful role in determining its own destiny. This reality is a product of the Zionist invasion of Iraq and the subsequent Iranian intervention, which enabled Tehran to exert partial control over Iraqi political life.
This arrangement was shaped by the political landscape of Iraq in 2003 and by military forces trained in Iran that were made available to the occupying power, forming the nucleus of the army and security apparatus through which occupied Iraq has been administered. To the observer, this situation may appear as though Iran and Zionism have reached an understanding to divide governance over Iraq—though the reality is far more complex, as I have argued elsewhere and will not revisit here.
The past two decades of political rule in Iraq—widely described by patriots within the country as corrupt—have confirmed this assessment. The system, sustained only to satisfy Iran and Zionism alike, is politically inert, economically consumptive, and wholly unproductive. It is managed by a class of opportunistic profiteers and thieves, devoid of any genuine concern for Iraq or its future. This, in essence, reaffirms the perspective that gave rise to this series.
Accordingly, I shall address two matters: first, what I propose Iran ought to do politically—not militarily—not only in its own interest but in that of the entire region, as will become clear; and second, what fate awaits Iraq.
What Are the Outcomes of the Aggression Thus Far?
Before presenting any political proposal to Iran, a brief reflection on the lessons of the forty-day aggression is necessary. A full accounting would require volumes and would not serve the purpose of this article. The essential conclusions are as follows:
1. Iran has surprised itself with its own capabilities and global weight. Since the end of its war with Iraq in 1988, it has not truly tested the strength it has accumulated. It has now come to recognize that it is militarily and politically more capable than it had assumed. This newfound awareness is reflected in the evolving rhetoric of its so-called “moderates,” including the president and foreign minister.
2. Iran has exposed a fundamental truth about Zionist military capability. Despite possessing nuclear weapons, advanced aircraft, and unparalleled technological advantages, Zionism has proven unable to decisively resolve conflicts in direct confrontation. A glimpse of this reality appeared during the 2003 invasion of Iraq—though Iraq failed to capitalize on it—but it manifested clearly in the recent battle of Isfahan, where Zionist forces were defeated by a relatively small Iranian contingent. The scale of this defeat is underscored by the loss of more aircraft in a single day than at any time since the Vietnam War of the 1970s, despite the deployment of elite forces aimed at securing enriched uranium.
3. The aggression has revealed a profound difference between Iranian and Arab opposition movements. The Iranian national opposition, despite its disagreements with the ruling system in Tehran, acted in 2026 as it did in 1980: it rallied around the state when faced with external aggression. By contrast, Arab opposition groups that claim patriotism have often aligned themselves with Zionist projects, contributing to the destruction of Arab lands, as seen in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. This divergence cannot be attributed merely to differences in regime oppression; rather, it reflects a deeper crisis of allegiance and integrity within Arab political culture.
What Is the Political Proposal?
I do not claim expertise in military affairs, nor do I presume to dictate battlefield strategy, which rightly belongs to those conducting the war. Nor can I predict how the conflict will ultimately conclude.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that unless Zionism resorts to devastating nuclear force sufficient to compel Iran’s surrender, Iran will endure as a state. The aggression will eventually give way to negotiations shaped by the political and economic realities it has produced.
I therefore offer a single political proposal—one that would place the great powers before a moment of truth, exposing both Zionist intentions for our region and the positions of other global actors, while stripping bare the political hypocrisy that has prevailed since the Second World War.
Zionism has historically developed and deployed weapons of mass destruction—from chemical weapons in earlier eras to nuclear arms in the twentieth century—while simultaneously asserting its exclusive right to possess such weapons. To secure this privilege, it has promoted international treaties that legitimize its monopoly while denying others the same capacity.
Without digressing too far, let us consider the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970). I contend that many who speak about this treaty in media and policy circles have never actually read it. Like any international agreement, it is entered into voluntarily and may also be withdrawn from voluntarily; there is no coercive mechanism compelling adherence.
The treaty’s stated aim was global nuclear disarmament. In practice, however, Zionism expanded its arsenal while systematically destroying any state that attempted to acquire similar capabilities, as occurred in Iraq and Libya. The treaty also established an agency to oversee compliance, structured in such a way that its leadership remains effectively controlled by the very powers it was meant to regulate.
Iran, like many Arab states, ratified the treaty—though the reasons for doing so remain unclear to me—while countries such as India, Pakistan, Israel, and South Africa abstained and ultimately acquired nuclear weapons without facing war, sanctions, or sustained pressure.
Iran subjected its nuclear program to international inspection, and early assessments confirmed its peaceful nature. Even when it increased uranium enrichment for stated scientific purposes, inspections found no concrete evidence of weaponization. Nevertheless, Zionism seized upon the ambiguity surrounding enrichment thresholds to allege military intent, escalating the issue to the Security Council, which imposed sanctions with the backing of the permanent members. This culminated in the 2015 agreement—later abandoned unilaterally by Zionism, which now demands the complete cessation of Iranian enrichment, contrary to the treaty’s provisions.
The notion that the conflict centers on control of the Strait of Hormuz is misleading. The core issue has always been Iran’s pursuit of nuclear technology—something Zionism refuses to permit outside its sphere of control.
The Proposal
Iran now has a political and legal option worth pursuing. It should present to the United Nations Security Council a proposal to declare the region stretching from Pakistan to the Atlantic—encompassing West Asia and North Africa—a nuclear-weapon-free zone, subject to uniform inspection standards preventing any illicit nuclear activity.
Such a proposal is both rational and strategically sound. It would deprive any state of the pretext that nuclear weapons are necessary for self-defense against regional threats. It would also align with precedents established in other parts of the world.
This initiative would force the major powers to reveal their true positions. If the United States rejects the proposal in order to preserve Israel’s nuclear arsenal, then France and Britain—both instrumental in enabling that arsenal—would face a profound test in justifying their stance.
More importantly for our region, it would clarify the positions of Russia and China. For decades, both have presented themselves as defenders of justice and stability in our region, yet their policies often accommodate Zionist dominance and the realities imposed by force.
Would they support the disarmament of Israel, or not? And if not, why?
Whether the proposal passes is of secondary importance. What matters is exposing the truth.
Should the proposal be rejected, Iran would possess full moral and legal justification to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has failed to protect it from nuclear coercion rooted in Israel’s arsenal.
I shall address, in the next installment, what I foresee for Iraq.
Abdul-Haq Al-Ani
14 April 2026