What, then, do I believe Iran ought to do as it confronts the Zionist onslaught? There is no shortage of ideas that might be advanced, yet I shall confine myself to two proposals which, in my view, strike at the very foundations upon which the aggression is justified.
No Negotiations Outside the Law
Anyone who has followed the discourse preceding the aggression—and the statements issued at its outbreak—cannot fail to notice the repeated calls for a cessation of hostilities and a return to negotiations. I was particularly struck by an article written by the Foreign Minister of the Sultanate of Oman, measured in tone, in which he urged precisely such a course. Yet His Excellency appears to have overlooked a fundamental question: upon what legal basis is Iran obliged to negotiate with Zionism over its sovereign right to determine its scientific or military policies?
To argue for renewed negotiations merely because they occurred in the past is insufficient, especially if those earlier negotiations were themselves conducted in violation of the law—under the weight of disproportionate power wielded by Zionism over political decision-making, even within the Security Council.
The essential question that must arise in the mind of any observer is this: why should Iran negotiate with the United States, or any other state, regarding its nuclear programme—or indeed any aspect of its armament? Unless a coherent answer is given, calls for renewed negotiations remain hollow and devoid of meaning.
When Iran ratified the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it placed its nuclear programme and research facilities under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). That agency—long subject, in practice, to Zionist influence—has inspected Iran repeatedly, as it once did Iraq and Syria, and has confirmed Iran’s compliance with the Treaty. A state that fulfils its treaty obligations cannot reasonably be required to do more; the Agency’s findings ought to have settled the matter.
Yet the true aim of the Zionist project in our region has never been limited to the disarmament of this or that weapon. Rather, it has been the pursuit of comprehensive hegemony—beginning with the domination of intellectual life and the suppression of scientific advancement that might enable states to achieve genuine independence. Nuclear research, after all, is not merely a pathway to weaponry but a gateway to broad scientific progress. For this reason, Zionism has refused to accept even the Agency’s confirmation of Iran’s compliance.
I shall not dwell here on the lengthy sequence of negotiations, Security Council resolutions, and sanctions that followed. It suffices to identify the fundamental error: Iran’s prior acceptance of conditions imposed upon it unlawfully—an error that must not be repeated.
Foremost among these errors is the notion that a state’s right to enrich uranium falls under the authority of the Security Council, so long as such enrichment is not directed toward weapon production. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons—not to obstruct the scientific development of states. Thus, the Security Council resolutions demanding that Iran suspend enrichment, and imposing sanctions upon its refusal, were taken ultra vires—beyond the Council’s lawful authority. The Council operates within the framework of international law, not above it; yet its permanent members have acted otherwise.
That Iran entered negotiations over its own rights—contrary to law—was facilitated by a faction within its political class, described by Zionism as “moderates,” who were willing to make concessions in exchange for what they perceived as guarantees of their continued position.
Even if we were to assume that all developments leading up to the 2015 agreement were lawful, the situation fundamentally changed when Zionism withdrew from that agreement. At that point, the agreement was effectively nullified, and it was incumbent upon the Security Council to address the consequences and determine responsibility. Instead, what followed bore no relation to law, the United Nations Charter, or the Treaty itself. It was a unilateral decision by Zionism that Iran must submit to a broader regional project—one whose earlier stages had already unfolded in Iraq, Libya, and Syria. When coercion failed, aggression followed.
It is therefore evident that calls to return to negotiations—such as those advanced by the Omani Foreign Minister—are neither legally sound nor politically grounded in the United Nations Charter or the Treaty. The Treaty does not grant any state the right to dictate how another should implement its provisions.
To compel Iran to negotiate with Zionism over the future of its nuclear programme is a violation of legal norms and a breach of the international order itself. This does not mean that Iran must reject negotiations in principle; rather, any negotiations must adhere strictly to the rule of law. No party has the right to dictate either the subject or the terms of such negotiations.
No to Adhesion Treaties
Any serious student of post–Second World War politics cannot fail to observe the treaties crafted by the victors to shape the global political order in accordance with their interests. Foremost among these is the United Nations Charter itself, drafted by the Allied powers to secure their dominance, institutionalised through the Security Council and its veto system.
Zionist influence has ensured that other states align their conduct with its interests when it comes to ratifying—or refraining from ratifying—international treaties. Various means have been employed, tailored to each state: coercion, pressure, intimidation, or inducement. This is evident in treaties such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the conventions banning chemical and biological weapons.
Yet when Zionism itself hesitated to ratify certain agreements—such as the four Geneva Conventions governing international humanitarian law—it did not encourage others to do so. Conversely, when it opposed agreements that might constrain its actions—such as the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court—it actively discouraged participation.
I was once told by a former Undersecretary of Justice in the Sultanate of Oman:
“We spent a long time travelling from one city to another, debating the Court’s statute. But when we had completed our work, the United States told us not to sign—so we did not.”
For three decades I have pondered this question: if certain Arab rulers—those dependent on external patronage—lacked either the will or the capacity to resist such directives, why did others, who claimed national or pan-Arab convictions, act in the same manner? Who persuaded leaders such as Gamal Abdel Nasser, Hafez al-Assad, Abdul Salam Arif, Muammar Gaddafi, and Ruhollah Khomeini to follow this course?
Some may argue that ratification makes little difference, as states would be subject to the same scrutiny regardless. This is not so. The Security Council cannot intervene in the affairs of a state that has not acceded to a treaty. This is precisely why “the usurper of Palestine” is never held accountable for its weapons of mass destruction: it is not a party to the relevant agreements, and thus lies beyond the Council’s reach.
In effect, it was those leaders from whom wisdom was expected who voluntarily placed the region under the authority of agencies and committees—often subject to Zionist influence—charged with inspection and oversight.
Is there, then, a single rational explanation for this persistent pattern?
No state in our region that has ratified such treaties can ignore how the relevant agencies conduct themselves. Their behaviour reveals the true purpose of the treaties they administer. For instance, the Agency, which under the Non-Proliferation Treaty is obliged to investigate nuclear contamination resulting from accidents or attacks, has yet to inspect any Iranian site struck by Zionist aggression—despite its readiness to investigate incidents elsewhere in the world.
This conduct mirrors its behaviour in Iraq during the 1990s, when it failed to respond adequately to requests to investigate nuclear leakage.
What Should Iran Do?
The attack on Bushehr, along with other research and enrichment facilities, and the Agency’s failure to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, provide compelling grounds for Iran to rectify what may be seen as a historic error: its ratification of the Treaty itself. The Treaty permits withdrawal, and Iran would be justified in exercising that right.
Such a step would not subject Iran to consequences greater than those it has already endured. But it would restore a measure of dignity forfeited at the moment of accession—a course of action that neither Iraq nor Syria was in a position to take when circumstances demanded it.
Abdul-Haq al-Ani
4 April 2026